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CRIMINAL LAW-RAPE-FORCIBLE COMPULSION-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that where there is a lack of
consent, but no showing of physical force, threat of physical
force, or psychological coercion, the "forcible compulsion" require-
ment of the Pennsylvania rape statute is not met.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY-RAPE SHIELD LAw-The Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court held that evidence that a complainant and
her boyfriend had argued over her past infidelities was inadmis-
sible under the Rape Shield Law, despite defendant's claim that
the evidence demonstrated that the complainant was motivated
by her boyfriend's jealousy to accuse the defendant of rape.
Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
In the spring of 1988, Robert A. Berkowitz (the "Appellee")
and the complainant were both sophomores at East Stroudsburg
State University.' On the afternoon of April 19th, 1988, the
complainant returned to her dormitory room after attending two
morning classes and then left to meet her boyfriend in the
lounge area of his dormitory.2 When her boyfriend failed to ap-
pear, the complainant left the lounge area and went upstairs to
visit a friend, Earl Hassel.3 Upon entering Hassel's room, the
complainant observed a male figure lying on the bed with a
pillow over his head, whom she thought was Hassel.' After re-
moving the pillow from his head, the complainant realized that
it was actually the Appellee, not Hassel.6 The Appellee, who
was awakened by the disturbance, persuaded the complainant to
stay and converse for a brief period of time.6 At this point, the
1. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1339 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992),
affd in part and vacated in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
2. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1339. The complainant and her boyfriend had had
a heated argument the previous night. Id.
3. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 1994). Hassel, the
Appellee's roommate, was not at home at the time of the complainant's visit.
Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1163. After knocking several times, the complainant then
tried the doorknob and, finding that it was unlocked, entered the room. Id.
4. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1340.
5. Id.
6. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1163. The complainant testified that she remained
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complainant took a seat on the floor beside the Appellee's bed.7
Thereafter, the Appellee quickly moved off of his bed, pushing
the complainant backwards with the force of his body.' The
Appellee then straddled the complainant, lifted her shirt and
began touching her.9 Next, the Appellee unsuccessfully attempt-
ed to force his penis into the complainant's mouth.'0 The com-
plainant testified that she stated "no" several times throughout
this episode, but was unable to move because the Appellee's
body was positioned over her." At no time, though, throughout
this encounter did the complainant physically resist the
Appellee's advances."2 The complainant did, however, claim
that she continued to verbally protest the Appellee's actions in a
scolding manner, insisting that she was late for the meeting
with her boyfriend. 3
Realizing that the dormitory room was still unlocked, the
Appellee arose to lock the door, disregarding complainant's as-
sertions that she had to leave."' The Appellee then returned to
the complainant and pushed her onto the bed."5 After removing
her sweatpants and undergarments, the Appellee then used his
hand to guide his penis into the complainant's vagina."
Throughout the encounter, the complainant continued to say
"no," but the Appellee did not withdraw. 7
in the room because she had a desire to initiate a friendship with the Appellee.
Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1340. The Appellee then suggested that the complainant give
him a backrub, to which she refused. Id.
7. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1340.
8. Id. The complainant later testified at trial that the force applied by the
Appellee did not constitute a shove. Id. According to the complainant, the push was
more of a "leaning-type of thing." Id.
9. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1163.
10. Id.
11. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1340.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. The record clearly showed that the door could be unlocked from the
inside and that the complainant was aware of this fact, but that she never attempt-
ed to go to the door or unlock it. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164.
15. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1163. At trial, the complainant concluded that
when she and the Appellee fell upon the bed there was not much of a discernible
bounce, indicating that the force applied by the Appellee was not substantial. Id. at
1164.
16. Id. At no point did the Appellee verbally threaten the complainant. Id.
Also, the complainant agreed that the Appellee's hands were not restraining her in
any manner during the actual penetration. Id. The only force the Appellee applied
was the weight of his body on top of the complainant during intercourse. Id. The
complainant did testify, however, that she stated the word "no" throughout the en-
counter. Id.
17. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1340. The complainant claimed that she could only
say "no" in a moaning tone because she felt as if she was in a dream-like state. Id.
1995 Recent Decisions
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed suit against the
Appellee in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County."8
After hearing testimony from both the Appellee and the com-
plainant, the jury convicted the Appellee of rape and indecent
assault."9 During the trial, the Appellee had attempted to intro-
duce evidence of the jealous nature of the complainant's boy-
friend in order to establish the complainant's motivation behind
her rape allegation.2" The trial court, citing the Rape Shield
Law,21 excluded any evidence that the complainant may have
denied consent solely for the purpose of avoiding a confrontation
with her boyfriend.' The Appellee appealed this decision to the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.'
On appeal, the Appellee presented the superior court with two
substantive issues: (1) what is the precise degree of actual physi-
cal force necessary to prove "forcible compulsion"2 under the
The Appellee testified that the complainant's moans were actually thinly veiled acts
of encouragement. Id. at 1341.
Immediately after the Appellee withdrew, he stated, "Wow, I guess we just
got carried away," to which the complainant responded, "No, we didn't get carried
away, you got carried away." Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1163.
The Appellee's testimony at trial offered a contrary account of the encounter
in question. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1341. According to the Appellee, he and the
complainant had had a flirtatious relationship in the past. Id. He testified that the
complainant had asked the Appellee, on more than one occasion, if she could see his
penis. Id. The Appellee claimed that he was under the belief that the complainant
wished to pursue a sexual relationship with him, and he stated that the complain-
ant had actually stopped by his room in the past, lying on his bed with her legs
spread open. Id. The Appellee believed that his suspicions were confirmed when the
complainant let herself into his room on the night in question. Id. The Appellee did
admit that he initiated the first physical contact, but that the complainant warmly
responded to his advances. Id. According to the Appellee, he first realized that some-
thing was wrong with the complainant only after he withdrew during intercourse
and noticed the blank look on her face. Id.
18. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1339.
19. Id. at 1341. Following his conviction, the Appellee was sentenced to serve
a term of one to four years for rape and a concurrent term of six to twelve months
for indecent assault. Id. at 1341-42.
20. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1165. Defense counsel wished to introduce this
evidence to show that it was the complainant's fear of her boyfriend's jealousy which
motivated her to accuse the Appellee of rape. Id.
21. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3104(a) (1983). The Rape Shield Law provides that:
Evidence of specific instances of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct, opin-
ion evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct, and reputation evi-
dence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct shall not be admissible in
prosecutions under this chapter except evidence of the alleged victim's past
sexual conduct with the defendant where consent of the alleged victim is at
issue and such evidence is otherwise admissible pursuant to the rules of evi-
dence.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3104(a).
22. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1348 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3104).
23. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1163.
24. The term "compulsion" is defined as a forcible inducement to the commis-
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 33:697
Pennsylvania rape statute,25 and (2) what is the scope of the
Pennsylvania Rape Shield Law.2" The superior court discharged
the Appellee as to the charge of rape, finding that the Appellee's
conduct did not rise to the level of forcible compulsion needed to
sustain a rape conviction in Pennsylvania." The court deter-
mined that although the Appellee's conduct was persistent, it
did not prove that the complainant was forced to engage in sexu-
al intercourse against her will.'
As to the charge of indecent assault, the superior court re-
versed the Appellee's conviction and remanded for a new trial,
holding that the trial court erred in its application of the Rape
Shield Law. The court concluded that because the evidence
was not offered to establish the complainant's past infidelities,
but rather only to show that the complainant and her boyfriend
had fought over the question of the complainant's unfaithful-
ness, the Rape Shield Law should not have been employed.0
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to consid-
er the precise degree of force necessary to prove the forcible
sion of an act. BLACK'S LAw DICTIoNARY 287 (6th ed. 1990). The adjective "forcible"
is defined as something that is "effected by force used against opposition or resis-
tance." Id. at 645. For a discussion of what constitutes "forcible compulsion," as
interpreted by the Pennsylvania courts, see Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d
1335, 1340 (Pa. 1988) ("The term 'orcible compulsion' does not describe either the
intensity of the force nor does it tell us the source of the opposition or resistance
that must be overcome.").
25. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1342. The crime of rape in Pennsylvania is defined
as follows:
Section 3121. Rape
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he engages in sexual
intercourse with another person not his spouse:
(1) by forcible compulsion
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a
person of reasonable resolution;
(3) who is unconscious; or
(4) who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such person is incapa-
ble of consent.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121 (1983 & Supp. 1994).
The victim of rape need not resist. Id. § 3107. The Official Comment to
section 3121 provides:
Rape is restricted to "classic" rape cases, i.e., where the woman is subdued by
violence or threat of violence. Subsection (2) extends existing law by making
the conduct rape if the woman submits because of threat of violence, etc. No
distinction is made between actual force and threat of force.
Id. § 3121 (official cmt.).
26. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1342.
27. Id. at 1347.
28. Id.
29. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1165.
30. Id.
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compulsion element of the crime of rape."1 On this issue, the
supreme court opined that the complainant's testimony failed to
introduce any statement which adequately described the force or
threat of force used against her."2 Although the complainant
testified that she said "no" throughout the encounter, the court
noted that this action may have been relevant to the issue of
consent, but it was not relevant to the issue of force.' There-
fore, following the rule established in Commonwealth v.
Mlinarich,' the supreme court held that absent a showing of
either physical force, a threat of physical force or psychological
coercion, a complainant's lack of consent did not meet the forc-
ible compulsion requirement under the Pennsylvania rape stat-
ute.3
The supreme court determined that the legislative intent in
adopting the rape statute was to differentiate between the crime
of rape and the lesser offense of indecent assault.36 The court
31. Id. at 1162. Justice Cappy wrote the unanimous opinion for the court. Id.
32. Id. at 1164. During defense counsel's questioning, the complainant conclud-
ed that it was possible that when the Appellee had lifted her shirt and bra she took
no physical action to discourage him. Id. Also, the complainant agreed that it was
possible that the only physical contact between her and the Appellee, just prior to
sexual intercourse, occurred when he untied the drawstrings of her sweatpants. id.
33. Id. Physical force, a threat of physical force, or psychological coercion may
be sufficient to support the element of "forcible compulsion" if found to be enough to
prevent resistance by a reasonable person. id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Mlinarich,
542 A.2d 1335, 1347 (Pa. 1988)).
34. 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988) (3-3 decision). In Mlinarich, the alleged victim, a
minor, claimed that she participated in sexual activities under threat of being recom-
mitted to a juvenile detention center. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d at 1337 (Nix, C.J., opinion
in support of affirmance). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in an evenly divided
opinion asserted that although the victim repeatedly made known her lack of con-
sent, the fact that she offered no physical resistance precluded the defendant's con-
viction under Pennsylvania's rape statute. Id. at 1342. Although the court was even-
ly divided in Mlinarich, Justice Cappy referred to Mlinarich as a plurality decision.
See Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164.
35. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164.
36. Id. at 1164-65. The crime of indecent assault is defined as follows:
A person who has indecent contact with another person not his spouse, or
causes such other to have indecent contact with him, is guilty of indecent
assault if:
(1) He does so without the consent of the other person;
(2) He knows that the other person suffers from a mental disease or
defect which renders him or her incapable of appraising the nature of
his or her conduct;
(3) He knows that the other person is unaware that an indecent contact
is being committed;
(4) He has substantially impaired the other person's power to appraise
or control his or her conduct, by administering or employing, without
the knowledge of other drugs, intoxicants or other means for the pur-
pose of preventing resistance; or
(5) The other person is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or
Duquesne Law Review
asserted that because the term forcible compulsion was conspic-
uously absent from the indecent assault statute, but expressly
included in the rape statute, the latter should be interpreted as
requiring something more than simply a lack of consent.37 The
court decided that if a non-consenting complainant was unable
to establish the forcible compulsion requirement necessary to
support a rape conviction, then the proper charge was the lesser
graded offense of indecent assault."
Once the court had determined that the forcible compulsion
element of rape had not been established, it examined whether
the trial court properly employed the Rape Shield Law in ex-
cluding evidence of the complainant's past arguments with her
boyfriend concerning her fidelity.39 According to the court, the
impetus behind the enactment of the Rape Shield Law was the
prevention of attacks upon a victim's chastity at sexual assault
trials.4" The court therefore concluded that the evidence alleg-
ing that the complainant and her boyfriend regularly fought
about her infidelity, was properly excluded by the trial court.41
For purposes of applying the Rape Shield Law, the supreme
court found that the Appellee's proffered evidence concerning the
complainant's prior arguments was indistinguishable from the
issue of the complainant's fidelity.42 The court vacated the su-
perior court's order, and reaffirmed the trial court's application
of the Rape Shield Law.'
THE FORCIBLE COMPULSION ELEMENT OF RAPE
The common law defined rape as the "unlawful carnal knowl-
edge" of a woman.., forcibly and against her will."' The en-
other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority
over him; or
(6) He is over 18 years of age and the other person is under 14 years
of age.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3126 (1983 & Supp. 1994).
37. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164-65.
38. Id. at 1166.
39. Id. at 1165.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1165.
43. Id. at 1166.
44. Carnal knowledge is defined "as the act of a man having sexual bodily
connections with a woman; sexual intercourse." BLACK'S LAW DIcToNARY 213-14 (6th
ed. 1990).
45. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 397 (citing Commonwealth v. Stephens, 17 A.2d
919, 920 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1941)).
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actment of the Crimes Code of 1860' first incorporated this
common law definition of rape into the statutory laws of Penn-
sylvania. 7 Following this approach, rape in Pennsylvania was
defined in terms of the victim's refusal to consent to intercourse,
thus primarily defining the crime in terms of the conduct of the
victim, not the actor.' Therefore, under common law and prior
Pennsylvania statutory enactments, emphasis was placed upon
the refusal to consent, which was deemed to illustrate the ele-
ment of force employed by the actor.49
Adhering to this common law definition of force, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Shrodes,5° refused
to convict a defendant on either assault with intent to ravish"'
or indecent assault52 under the Penal Code of 1939, and held
that a victim's lack of resistance evidenced her consent. ' In
Shrodes, the defendant, while visiting the victim, pulled her into
the bedroom and suggested that they have sexual intercourse.
54
46. See 1860 Pa. Laws 374, § 91.
47. See Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395, 397 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
Prior to the enactment of the Crimes Code, Pennsylvania did not have a
statute which defined the crime of rape. Stephens, 17 A.2d at 920. Instead, the
Pennsylvania legislature simply deferred to the law of England that was in force
when the colony was established. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 3 A.2d 1007, 1010
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1939). The statute then in force in England read, "if a man from
henceforth do ravish a woman married, maid, or other, where she did not consent,
neither before nor after, he shall have judgment of life and of member." Stephens,
17 A.2d at 920 (citing 13 Edw. I, Stat. Westm. 2, c.34 (1285)). Under this definition,
the term "ravish" meant to have carnal knowledge of a woman by force. Stephens,
17 A.2d at 920 (citing Fletcher, 8 Cox C.C. at 134).
48. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moskorison, 85 A.2d 644, 646 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1952) (determining that the phrase "agaihst her will" was synonymous with "without
her consent").
49. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 411 (Spaeth, J., dissenting). As a result of this
emphasis, a victim, both at common law and under the prior Pennsylvania statutory
enactments, had the duty at trial to prove that she had offered a "high degree" of
resistance during the encounter. Id. If, however, the "compulsion was by threat of
force, instead of by the actual application of force . . . the threats had to be such as
to excuse the victim from the duty of 'utmost resistance.' " Id. Some examples of
"utmost resistance" include "fear of death,* "fear of great personal injury' and "fear
of great bodily harm." Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 commentary at 308
(1980)). Women, threatened with violence, who chose to submit to the assailant's
advances rather than risk possible death or bodily harm by resisting, were often
times deemed to have consented to the act. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 411 (Spaeth J.,
dissenting).
50. 46 A.2d 483 (Pa. 1946).
51. Assault with intent to ravish was defined as an, "assault and battery upon
a female, with intent, forcibly and against her will, to have unlawful carnal knowl-
edge of her." 1939 Pa. Laws 375, § 722.
52. Indecent assault was defined as, "the taking by a man of indecent liberties
with the person of a female without her consent and against her will, but with no
intent to commit the crime of rape." Shrodes, 46 A.2d at 485.
53. Shrodes, 46 A.2d at 485.
54. id. The defendant had been a close personal friend of the victim for about
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At no point during the encounter, though, did the victim cry out
or physically resist defendant's advances." The issue before the
court was whether the victim's lack of resistance evidenced her
consent to the defendant's sexual advances."M Following the
common law approach, the court relied upon the victim's resis-
tance to determine the actual amount of force employed by the
defendant. 7 Because the victim failed to resist in any manner,
the court concluded that the defendant's conduct did not rise to
the level of force necessary for a conviction under either
charge."8
In Commonwealth v. Moskorison," the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania adhered to the supreme court's holding in Shrodes,
defining the force element of rape in terms of the victim's con-
duct." In Moskorison, the defendant had sexual intercourse
with the victim during their first date."' Although the victim
did not physically resist the defendant's advances, it was estab-
lished that the defendant choked the victim in an attempt to
stifle her screams.62 In determining whether the trial court
committed reversible error in its charge to the jury, the
Moskorison court discussed, in dictum, the element of force."
The superior court defined the crime of rape as the unlawful
carnal knowledge of a woman, by the use of force, and against
her will." The court asserted that the phrase "against her will"
one and one-half years and had visited her on several prior occasions. Id.
55. Id. The victim did not have any scratches on her body and her clothing
was not torn as a result of the incident. Id. at 485.
56. Id. at 484-86.
57. Id. at 485.
58. Shrodes, 46 A.2d at 485. Courts in other jurisdictions have applied similar
reasoning when faced with the question of what constitutes sufficient force under a
sexual assault statute. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 118 So.2d 806, 814-15 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1960) (holding evidence insufficient to show forcible compulsion where the
victim shoved the defendant's shoulders, but did not cross her legs or resist in any
other way); People v. McKinzie, 163 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill. 1959) (holding that the evi-
dence was insufficient to convict defendant of rape where the victim never cried out
or endeavored to obtain help); Zamora v. State, 449 S.W.2d 43, 46-47 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1969) (holding that more than mere lack of consent was needed to establish
the force element of rape; the woman must have resisted in some manner).
59. 85 A.2d 644 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952).
60. Moskorison, 85 A.2d at 646.
61. Id. at 645. Following a casual meeting, the victim made a tentative date
with the defendant. Id. A few nights later, the defendant and a friend picked up the
victim and drove her to a secluded area where the defendant then had sexual in-
tercourse with her. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 646.
64. Id. The court reached this decision by following both the common law and
the Penal Code of 1939. Id.
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was synonymous with the term "without her consent. "' There-
fore, by considering the conduct of the victim in attempting to
scream, the Moskorison court exemplified the court's tendency to
evaluate the victim's conduct in determining force."
In 1962, the American Law Institute (the "ALI") set forth a
comprehensive statement of the crime of rape in its Model Penal
Code (the "MPC"). 7 Because of the often unjust results
achieved by the common law, the drafters of the MPC selected
an innovative standard to define the amount of coercion neces-
sary for forcible rape.' The essence of that approach was to re-
define the common law notion of rape by shifting the emphasis
from the victim's refusal to consent to the actor's use of force or
coercion.69 The common law requirements of "without her con-
sent" and "against her will" were both conspicuously deleted
from the MPC.70 Also absent from the text of the MPC were
any references to the need for a woman to resist during an at-
tack. 1 Therefore, by placing the emphasis of the provision on
the assailant's conduct, the drafters successfully abrogated the
stringent requirements often imposed under the old common law
approach.72
Following the innovative standard introduced by the MPC, the
65. Moskorison, 85 A.2d at 646.
66. Id.
67. See Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1222 (Pa. 1986). In an effort
to codify the entire criminal law, the MPC started with the common law, but also
added modern theories and perspectives on the changing law in this area throughout
the United States. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1962).
68. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1. The relevant sections of the MPC dealing
with forcible rape provided:
(1) Rape. - A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is
guilty of rape if:
(a) he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent death,
serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on
anyone ....
Rape is a felony of the second degree unless (i) in the course thereof the actor
inflicts serious bodily injury upon anyone, or (ii) the victim was not a volun-
tary social companion of the actor upon the occasion of the crime and had not
previously permitted him sexual liberties, in which cases the offense is a felo-
ny of the first degree.
(2) Gross Sexual Imposition.- A male who has sexual intercourse with a fe-
male not his wife commits a felony of the third degree if:
(a) he compels her to submit by any threat that would prevent resis-
tance by a woman of ordinary resolution ....
Id.
69. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 412 (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
70. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1.
71. Id.
72. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4 commentary at 247 (Tentative Draft No.
4, 1955).
706 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 33:697
Pennsylvania legislature in 1972 enacted Section 3121 of the
Crimes Code ("Section 3121")" and rejected the common law
and the 1939 Penal Code's reference to intercourse "against the
will" of the victim.74 Although based primarily on the MPC,
Section 3121 modified the MPC's sexual assault provisions by
employing the phrase forcible compulsion.75 Instead of adopting
the three tier severity structure employed by the MPC, the
Pennsylvania General Assembly created a single offense of forc-
ible rape.7" In defining this offense, the legislature simply re-
ferred to forcible compulsion, thus embracing in a single phrase
both types of force. 7
Under this new approach, the forcible compulsion requirement
was to be determined solely by analyzing the assailant's conduct
during the encounter.78 The Pennsylvania General Assembly,
however, did not define the term forcible compulsion as it ap-
plied to Section 3121.
7
1
Throughout the 1970's and early 1980's the phrase forcible
compulsion was interpreted strictly by the Pennsylvania
courts." The term forcible compulsion was initially interpreted
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v.
Perrin.81 In Perrin, the defendant, after fighting with his girl-
friend, entered her roommate's bedroom and raped her.82 In
Perrin, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the amount
of force necessary to rise to the level of forcible compulsion.'
73. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121 (1983 & Supp. 1994).
74. See Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 412 (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
75. Compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3121 (1), (2) (rape by actual or threatened
forcible compulsion is a first degree felony) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962) (rape by actual force is a first or second degree felony
and under threat of force is a third degree felony).
76. See Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 399. See notes 25 and 68 for the provisions of
the two sections in question.
77. See Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 414 (Spaeth, J., dissenting). By implementing
the phrase forcible compulsion, the legislature rejected the MPC's distinction between
compulsion by "force" and compulsion by force involving the "inflict[tion] [oil serious
bodily injury.* Id.
78. Id. at 412.
79. Therefore, Pennsylvania courts were left with the task of determining how
rape - with the requisite forcible compulsion element - could be established with-
out any clear guidance from the state legislature.
80. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Perrin, 398 A.2d 1007 (Pa. 1979); Common-
wealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), affd 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa.
1988); Commonwealth v. Biggs, 467 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
81. 398 A.2d 1007 (Pa. 1979).
82. Perrin, 398 A.2d at 1009. Upon completion of the sexual assault, the de-
fendant then murdered the roommate. Id. The roommate was found strangled and
the defendant was charged with murder based upon the felony murder rule. Id. The
underlying felony involved in the case was involuntary sexual intercourse. Id.
83. Id. at 1009-10.
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The Perrin court defined forcible compulsion as it applied to
the Crimes Code's definition of involuntary deviate sexual inter-
course.' The court reasoned that involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse was committed only when an assailant forced a
victim by actual physical compulsion or threats thereof to en-
gage in acts of anal or oral intercourse. 5 Thus, the court con-
cluded that the defendant's conduct rose to the level of forcible
compulsion."
Following the strict analysis handed down by the supreme
court in Perrin, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania refused to
convict a defendant under Section 3121, finding that acts of
moral coercion failed to rise to the level of forcible compulsion.'
In Commonwealth v. Biggs," the superior court held that sexu-
al intercourse induced by moral coercion was not rape.' In
Biggs, the defendant coerced his daughter into having sexual
relations with him by claiming that the Bible stated that it was
the eldest daughter's duty to have intercourse with the father
when the mother no longer sexually gratified the father.' The
court found that moral persuasion or threats of humiliation were
insufficient as a matter of law to constitute a threat of forcible
compulsion under section 3121(2). 1 The court reasoned that by
allowing acts of moral coercion to establish the element of forc-
ible compulsion, the clear import of Section 3121 would be ig-
nored. 2 Thus, the court concluded that the evidence was in-
84. IdM The crime of deviate sexual intercourse is defined as:
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he engages in deviate
sexual intercourse with another person:
(1) by forcible compulsion;
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a
person of reasonable resolution;
(3) who is unconscious;
(4) who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such person is incapa-
ble of consent: or
(5) who is less than sixteen years of age.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3123 (1983).
85. Perrin, 398 A.2d at 1009-10. Although this case did not involve the crime
of rape, a comparison of Section 3121 and Section 3123 demonstrates that the legis-
lature has used the term forcible compulsion uniformly throughout the Crimes Code.
86. Perrin, 398 A.2d at 1010. The court based its holding on the fact that the
victim had been strangled to death and that her clothing had been torn from her
body. Id.
87. See Commonwealth v. Biggs, 467 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
88. 467 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
89. Biggs, 467 A.2d at 32.
90. Id. The defendant also told his daughter that if she ever told anyone, he
would show people nude pictures of her. Id. The defendant never struck or physical-





sufficient to establish that the intercourse was accomplished
through physical force or any threat of physical force that would
prevent resistance by a reasonable person."
In 1985, the superior court continued to comply with the strict
interpretation of the forcible compulsion requirement in Com-
monwealth v. Mlinarich.4 In Mlinarich, the defendant, who
had custody of the victim, coerced the victim into engaging in
sexual relations by threatening to return her to a juvenile deten-
tion center if she refused to comply.9" The issue before the court
was whether the existence of a parent-child relationship and the
threat of being sent back to a detention center were sufficient to
compel a thirteen year-old victim not to resist sexual intercourse
with her custodian.9
The court determined that the Pennsylvania General Assem-
bly intended to exclude from its definition of rape acts where the
victim had made a deliberate choice to have intercourse in order
to avoid an undesirable alternative which did not involve inflic-
tion of further bodily harm.97 Furthermore, the court decided
that the forcible compulsion element of rape was not established
because there was no evidence that the victim was threatened
with immediate death, physical injury or kidnapping." The
court opined that the Pennsylvania General Assembly's explicit
rejection of the three-tiered severity structure employed by the
MPC in its rape provision, indicated an intention to require a
high level of physical force to establish rape."9 Therefore, the
court concluded that forcible compulsion required proof that the
victim was actually threatened with serious physical force in
93. Id. See also 18 PA. CONST. STAT. §§ 3121 (1), (2).
94. 498 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), aft'd 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988) (3-3
decision).
95. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 396. In Mlinarich, the victim had been committed
to a juvenile detention house at the age of thirteen. Id. The defendant, a neighbor
of the victim's father, agreed to assume custody of the victim. Id. Shortly thereafter,
beginning on the victim's fourteenth birthday, the defendant initiated sexual rela-
tions with the victim. Id.
96. Id. at 403.
97. Id. at 400. The majority opinion stated that:
To allow a conviction for rape where the alleged victim has deliberately chosen
intercourse in preference to some other unpleasant sensation not amounting to
physical injury or violence would be to trivialize the plight of the helpless vic-
tim of a violent rape. The latter is truly a felony of the first degree. The for-
mer is not.
Id. at 402.
98. Id. at 400. By allowing "forcible compulsion" to be established without
evidence of physical force, the court predicted a "veritable parade of threats, express
and implied, in support of accusations of rape." Id. at 402.
99. Id. at 399-400. See also note 68 for the relevant provision of the MPC.
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Finally, in 1986, on the heels of the superior court's decision
in Mlinarich, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for the first
time, expanded its interpretation of forcible compulsion. In Com-
monwealth v. Rhodes,1 1 the court determined that evidence of
physical force was no longer required to support a rape convic-
tion under Section 3121.12 In Rhodes, the twenty-year-old de-
fendant lured an eight-year-old child into an abandoned building
and had sexual intercourse with her."tc The court addressed
the issue of whether the forcible compulsion requirement of
Section 3121 could be established when sexual intercourse was
not induced- through the use of physical force or threats there-
of.14
Through a comparison of Section 3121 and the MPC rape
provision, the court reasoned that the Pennsylvania legislature
intended to give a broader meaning to the term forcible compul-
sion than that given to the term in the MPC.' 5 The court de-
termined that the legislature intended the term forcible compul-
sion to include any physical, moral, psychological, or intellectual
force found to compel a person to have intercourse against that
person's will.0 Under this new approach, the Rhodes court di-
rected future courts to view the term forcible compulsion in an
expansive light when deciding appeals based on the sufficiency
of forcible compulsion evidence10
100. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 397-400. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Spaeth
argued that the Pennsylvania General Assembly intended forcible compulsion to be
interpreted as "compulsion by physical, moral, or intellectual means or by the exi-
gencies of the circumstances." Id. at 404 (Spaeth, J., dissenting). After analyzing the
three sources of section 3121 - the 1939 Penal Code, the Model Penal Code, and
the Proposed Crimes Code - Judge Spaeth reasoned that by defining forcible com-
pulsion in terms of physical force, the inquiry of the court would continue to focus
on the victim's conduct, thus undermining the MPC's switch in emphasis to the
actions of the defendant. Id. at 412. See note 107 for a discussion of the supreme
court's disposition of Mlinarich on appeal.
101. 510 A.2d 1217 (Pa. 1986).
102. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1227.
103. Id. at 1218-19. The superior court had reversed a conviction for forcible
rape, reasoning that there was insufficient evidence of "forcible compulsion" or
threats thereof. Id. at 1220.
104. Id. at 1218-28.
105. Id. at 1224. The Rhodes court concluded that the terminology employed in
the comparable provisions of the MiVPC ("compels her to submit by force or by threat
of imminent death") was directed more at acts of physical force or violence. Rhodes,
510 A.2d at 1224 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1)(a)). Therefore, the court
decided that the term forcible compulsion had a broader meaning than the compara-
ble provision of the MPC. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1224.
106. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1226.
107. Id. In the interim between the Rhodes and Berkowitz decisions, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide only one other case in which
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ADMISSIBILITY UNDER THE RAPE SHIELD LAW
It is a well established principle of law that the protections
guaranteed by the federal constitution provide the minimum
rights which must be afforded to a defendant in a criminal ac-
tion."'0 Under the Sixth Amendment, each defendant is guar-
anteed the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses."m In
Davis v. Alaska,"' the Supreme Court noted that cross-exami-
nation had traditionally been permitted for the purpose of im-
peaching witnesses."' The Court emphasized that a primary
function of cross-examination was the exposure of a witness's
motivation in testifying against the defendant."2
The Davis rationale was reaffirmed in Delaware v. Van
Arnsdall." In Van Arnsdall, the Court held that a criminal
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation was violated
the primary issue was whether the evidence sufficiently established the forcible com-
pulsion element of rape. In that case, Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, the supreme
court was evenly divided on the issue of whether the threat of being returned to a
detention center was sufficient to rise to the level of forcible compulsion. See Com-
monwealth v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335, 1336 (Pa. 1988) (3-3 decision). Because the
court was split on the issue, the superior court decision which held that the threat
did not constitute forcible compulsion was affirmed. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d at 1336.
Chief Justice Nix, writing the opinion in support of affirmance, acknowledged that
psychological force could rise to the level of forcible compulsion. Id. at 1342 (citing
Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217 (Pa. 1986)). However, the Chief Justice
distinguished psychological coercion from forcing an individual to make a "choice
regardless how repugnant." Mlinarich, 542 A.2d at 1342 (Nix, C.J., opinion in sup-
port of affirmance). The opinion in support of reversal, authored by former Justice
Larsen, chastised the three affirming justices for "ignor[ing] Rhodes and pretend[ing]
that it does not exist." Mlinarich, 542 A.2d at 1349 (Larsen, J., opinion in support
of reversal).
108. See Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 567 A.2d 1357, 1359 (Pa. 1989) (citations
omitted).
109. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1348. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part that, "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . be
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
110. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). In Davis, the petitioner was convicted of grand larce-
ny and burglary based upon an eyewitness identification. Davis, 415 U.S. at 310. At
trial, the petitioner wished to introduce evidence of the witness's prior criminal re-
cord in an effort to demonstrate that the witness was cooperating with police due to
fear or concern of manipulation of his probation. Id. at 311. The trial court granted
a protective order, and petitioner was precluded from revealing that the witness had
been on probation. Id. at 311-12.
111. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316. The term "impeachment of witness" means, "[tlo
call in question the veracity of that witness, by means of evidence adduced for such
purpose, or the adducing of proof that a witness is unworthy of belief." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 753 (6th ed. 1990).
112. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-17 (citations omitted).
113. 475 U.S. 673 (1986). During respondent's murder trial, the Delaware trial
court had refused to allow defense counsel to cross-examine a prosecution witness
about an agreement he had made to testify in exchange for the dismissal of an
unrelated criminal charge. Van Arnsdall, 475 U.S. at 676.
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when that defendant was prohibited from engaging in cross-
examination which was designed to demonstrate bias on the
part of a witness."4 The Court concluded that it was only
through cross-examination that the jury was exposed to facts
from which they could appropriately draw inferences relating to
the reliability of the witness."5 Thus, the exclusion of evidence
of possible bias from the jury would leave the jury with an im-
precise picture of the facts."'
Article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution also pro-
tects a defendant's right to confront witnesses against him."7
In Commonwealth v. Lloyd,"' the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court determined that although the state constitutional provi-
sion was analogous to the federal constitution provision, the
state retained the power to provide broader standards than
those mandated federally."9 Therefore, the court reasoned that
the Pennsylvania Constitution gave rise to a more expansive
reading of the defendant's right to confront and cross-examine a
witness. 2'
In Pennsylvania, this guaranteed right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses was severely limited with respect to sexual
assault trials by the enactment of the Rape Shield Law. 2' In
1976, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted section 3104
in an effort to prevent personal attacks on the victim's character
and sexual history at trial.'22 Under section 3104, evidence of
the victim's past sexual conduct, as well as reputation or opinion
evidence of such conduct, was only admissible when consent was
at issue and such evidence was otherwise admissible under the
114. Van Arnadall, 475 U.S. at 678-79.
115. Id. at 679.
116. Id.
117. PA. CONST. art. I, § 9. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that, "the
accused hath a right to . . . meet the witnesses face to face." Id.
118. 567 A.2d 1357 (Pa. 1989).
119. Lloyd, 567 A.2d at 1359.
120. Id.
121. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3104 (1983). See note 21 for the relevant provi-
sion of the Pennsylvania Rape Shield Law. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Folino, 439
A.2d 145 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 421 A.2d 257 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1980).
122. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 638 A.2d 940, 942 (Pa. 1994). In the past,
it often seemed that the victim of a sexual attack was the one on trial. Susan N.
Williams, Comment, Rape Reform Legislation and Evidentiary Concerns: The Law in
Pennsylvania, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 955, 957 (1982-83). Historically, a victim's lack of
chastity and prior sexual conduct were offered as part of a general attack upon the
credibility of the victim. Id. Recently, however, a majority of jurisdictions have enact-
ed statutory provisions called Rape Shield Laws, which limit the admissibility of
evidence of past sexual behavior of the victim, Id. at 958.
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rules of evidence. 2 ' Any defendant who wished to offer such
evidence had to first file a written motion and an offer of
proof 24 to the judge before the trial began.'25 When the evi-
dence proffered was sufficiently specific, the trial court was then
required to hold an in camera hearing to determine the relevan-
cy and admissibility of the evidence. 2 '
Following the enactment of the Rape Shield Law, the courts of
Pennsylvania consistently held that prior sexual conduct with
third persons was inadmissible to attack the character of the
victim in sexual assault trials.'27  In Commonwealth v.
Dear,2' the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that evidence
that purported to introduce the victim's past criminal record,
consisting of prior convictions for prostitution, was inadmissible
under the Rape Shield Law.'29
In Dear, the defendant approached the victim in a bar and
propositioned her for sex. 3' The victim, however, successfully
rebuked the defendant's offer.'3 ' Upon leaving the bar, the vic-
tim was accosted by the defendant, and then forced at gunpoint
to engage in sexual intercourse.'32 The issue was whether the
Rape Shield Law excluded evidence of the victim's prior prostitu-
tion convictions when offered as an attempt to establish the
victim's consent.' The court ruled that this evidence was in-
admissible, and held that the victim's prior sexual conduct with
third persons was not relevant to the issue of consent between
123. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3104(a), (b).
124. An "offer of proof' is made at a hearing or a trial 'when in objection to a
question has been sustained." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1082 (6th ed. 1990). The
aggrieved party may indicate, in camera for the record, "the answer which would
have been given if the question had not been excluded." Id. 'The appellate court is
then in a position to determine from the record the correctness of the ruling and
the prejudice in its exclusion, if any." Id.
125. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3104(b).
126. Id. At an in camera hearing, the trial court should determine the following
as a matter of record to be preserved for appellate review: (1) is the proposed evi-
dence relevant to show bias or motive or to attack credibility; (2) is the evidence
more probative than prejudicial; and (3) are there alternative means of proving bias
or motive to challenge credibility. See Commonwealth v. Black, 487 A.2d 396, 401
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). This pretrial hearing is not intended to give the trial judge
an opportunity to determine the credibility of the evidence. See Commonwealth v.
Baronner, 471 A.2d 104, 106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
127. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Boone, 466 A.2d 198 (Pa. Super. Ct . 1983);
Commonwealth v. Majorana, 445 A.2d 529, 531 n.7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Common-
wealth v. Duncan, 421 A.2d 257, 259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
128. 492 A.2d 714 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
129. Dear, 492 A.2d at 718.
130. Id. at 715.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 716.
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the victim and the defendant. 34 Thus, the court concluded that
the exclusion of this evidence under the Rape Shield Law did
not constitute a denial of the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation.3 6
In the last decade, though, limited exceptions to the broad
exclusionary scope of the Rape Shield Law have arisen.38' In
Commonwealth v. Black,"7  the superior court considered
whether the Rape Shield Law could exclude evidence intended to
show that the victim had a motive to fabricate rape charges
against the defendant.'38
In Black, the defendant was convicted of statutory rape and
other related offenses with respect to his daughter.'3 9 In his
defense, the defendant proposed to show through cross-examina-
tion, that his daughter maintained an ongoing, consensual sexu-
al relationship with her brother.4 ' The court' held that a
defendant's right to confrontation required the admission of such
evidence.' 4' The superior court reasoned that a defendant had
a right to reveal by cross-examination evidence of an adverse
party's bias or hostility towards the defendant.4 2 The court
concluded that the exclusion of evidence, which logically demon-
strated a witness's bias or prejudice, unconstitutionally infringed
upon the defendant's right to confrontation under both the feder-
al and Pennsylvania Constitutions.'43
134. Dear, 492 A.2d at 720. See also Commonwealth v. Quartman, 458 A.2d
994, 996-97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (evidence of the victim's past sexual relations with
third persons was of little relevance to the issue of consent between the victim and
the defendant); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 421 A.2d 257, 259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)
(holding that evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with third persons was not
admissible for any purpose).
135. Dear, 492 A.2d at 720 n.2.
136. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 599 A.2d 1340, 1342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
137. 487 A.2d 396 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
138. Black, 487 A.2d at 396.
139. Id. at 397.
140. Id. at 398. The defendant contended that the only means of establishing
the victim's bias against him was to reveal her abnormal relationship with the
brother, which had been terminated by the defendant. Id.
141. Id. at 399.
142. Id. See Commonwealth v. Cheatham, 239 A.2d 293 (Pa. 1968).
143. Black, 487 A.2d at 401-02. Although the Black decision successfully carved
out an exception to the Rape Shield Law in Pennsylvania, this exception is not
absolute. In Black, the court emphasized the importance of the Rape Shield Law and
set forth several limitations on the exception it had adopted. Id. The court reasoned
that evidence which tended to show the victim's prejudice or lack of credibility could
be excluded if its probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice. Id. Evidence
which showed the victim's bias, prejudice, or lack of credibility, could nevertheless be
inadmissible if it, "[wlould so inflame the minds of the jurors that its probative
value is outweighed by unfair prejudice." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 450
A.2d 732, 734 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)). This balancing test should be determined by
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Several superior court panels, however, have limited the
Black exception by excluding evidence of bias when the proposed
evidence failed to establish that the victim had a motive to fabri-
cate the charges.'" In Commonwealth v. Boyles,' the superi-
or court considered whether the admission of evidence that the
victim had reported two prior sexual assaults would violate the
Rape Shield Law.1"
In Boyles, the defendant, a cable repairman, had sexual inter-
course with the victim while he was at her home during a rou-
tine maintenance call. "' The defendant sought to introduce
evidence of the victim's prior sexual assault claims in an effort
to attack her credibility.' "  The Boyles court refused to apply
the Black exception, and held that the defendant presented no
evidence that the victim's past allegations were false or that the
victim's credibility was affected by any motive to seek revenge
against the defendant. "9 Therefore, the court determined that
the impetus behind the defendant's offer of proof was merely an
attempt to prove the victim's consent."ai The court, therefore,
adhered to the broad scope of the Rape Shield Law, along with
the acknowledged limitation of the Black decision and rejected
the defendant's proffered evidence. 5'
Recently, however, the Pennsylvania Superior Court admitted
evidence of bias despite the fact that the defendant had failed to
establish that the victim had a motive to fabricate charges." 2
In Commonwealth v. Wall,' the defendant denied having sex-
the trial court at an in camera hearing. See Dear, 492 A.2d at 719 n.1.
Additionally, the Black court noted that its decision was only applicable
when a defendant sought to introduce evidence which demonstrated the witness's
bias or prejudice. Black, 487 A.2d at 399 n.7. The court acknowledged that in in-
stances where a defendant offered evidence to establish the victim's consent, the
Black exception was not applicable and the Rape Shield Law was controlling. Id.
144. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 599 A.2d 1340, 1344 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991) (no evidence on the record of victim's bias towards the defendant); Common-
wealth v. Nieves, 582 A.2d 341, 347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Commonwealth v. Troy,
553 A.2d 992 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
145. 595 A.2d 1180 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
146. Boyles, 595 A.2d at 1185.
147. Id. at 1182. The defendant contended that the victim consented to the
sexual acts, and, in fact, was the initiator. Id. at 1183 n.1.
148. Id. at 1186. According to the defendant, the victim's two prior claims in-
dicated her propensity for making false allegations, thus implying that the present
allegations were false. Id. at 1185.
149. Id. at 1185-86. In fact, the victim had never even seen the defendant
before the attack. Id. at 1186.
150. Id.
151. Boyles, 595 A.2d at 1186.
152. See Commonwealth v. Wall, 606 A.2d 449 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
153. 606 A.2d 449 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
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ual relations with the victim and sought to introduce evidence of
the victim's prior successful sexual prosecution of her mother's
boyfriend."" The issue the court considered was whether evi-
dence which demonstrated the victim's knowledge of the content
and consequences of making a sexual abuse claim, should be
excluded by the Rape Shield Law when the defendant failed to
conclusively establish the victim's motive to fabricate charg-
es. 155
The Wall court decided that any evidence which tended to
show that the claim was fabricated was relevant to the defense;
therefore, evidence which tended to exculpate the defendant of
the charges was admissible.' 6 The court reasoned that al-
though the defendant had not established a specific bias or hos-
tility on the part of the victim, as required in Black, the peculiar
knowledge of the victim was more probative than prejudicial." 7
Therefore, the court concluded, where the proffered evidence
tended to show that the charge may have been fabricated, a
defendant had a constitutional right to confront and cross-exam-
ine the witness.15
The foregoing analysis of cases interpreting the forcible com-
pulsion requirement of Section 3121 clearly demonstrates the
inadequacy of the Pennsylvania rape statute. Force has long
been viewed as a necessary element in the crime of rape. 5
Prior to the development of the MPC, rape in Pennsylvania was
primarily defined in terms of the conduct of the victim, not the
actor. 80 Although conviction required proof that the sexual in-
154. Wall, 606 A.2d at 452. Previously, the victim had been removed from her
mother's house and placed in foster care after being sexually assaulted by her
mother's boyfriend. Id. The defendant contended that the proffered evidence tended
to show the victim's awareness of the fact that a sexual abuse claim could lead to
her removal from the defendant's home. Id. The court, however, found that the
victim's motive to fabricate rape charges against the defendant was "conspicuously
absent" from the evidence offered at trial. Id. at 462.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 459-60. The term "exculpatory" means "clearing or tending to clear
from alleged fault or guilt." BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 566 (6th ed. 1990).
157. Wall, 606 A.2d at 459, 462.
158. Id. at 466.
159. See Stephens, 17 A.2d at 920.
160. See Helene S. Shapo, Note, Recent Statutory Developments in the Definition
of Forcible Rape 61 VA. L. REv. 1500, 1504 (1975). This emphasis reflected the skep-
ticism of the common law towards accusations of rape. See Mtinarich, 498 A.2d at
411 (Spaeth, J., dissenting). According to Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale, the
accused man was actually the real victim: "[rnape is an accusation easily to be made
and hard to be proved, and harder still to be defended by the party accused, tho
never so innocent." Id. at 411 n.2 (quoting Chief Justice Matthew Hale, 1 HISTORY
OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (London 1st ed. 1736)). This quote is also cited in
Berkowitz. See Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1345 n.5.
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tercourse had been accomplished forcibly, the emphasis of the
inquiry was on the victim's refusal to consent, and proof of the
element of force was regarded as relevant to that refusal.'
Influenced by the innovative approach adopted by the MPC,
which shifted the emphasis in a rape prosecution from the
victim's refusal to consent to the assailant's use of force or coer-
cion, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted Section 3121
of the Crimes Code. 6 2 Under this statute, forcible compulsion
or the threat thereof is clearly a material element of the crime of
rape. Although theoretically innovative, Section 3121 has given
rise to the question of what constitutes forcible compulsion un-
der Pennsylvania's rape statute.
In its analysis of Berkowitz, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
strictly interpreted the requirements necessary for a rape convic-
tion under subsections (1) and (2) of Section 3121." s Acknowl-
edging the Rhodes precedent, the court looked to the totality of
facts in Berkowitz and concluded that the forcible compulsion
element of Section 3121 was not established.'6" According to
the court, the victim's testimony was completely devoid of any
evidence which illustrated the degree of force employed by the
defendant. 6 ' Therefore, because the forcible compulsion ele-
ment of Section 3121 was not proven, the court determined that
the crime of rape could not be established."
In addressing the issue of consent, the supreme court relied
upon the statutory enactments of the Pennsylvania General
Assembly in an effort to differentiate between lack of consent
and forcible compulsion.6 7 According to the court, the enact-
ment of the indecent assault statute, which included the phrase
"without the consent of the other person,"" indicated that the
legislature intended the term forcible compulsion in the rape
statute to be defined as something more than merely a lack of
consent." 9 Thus, the fact that the victim repeatedly stated "no"
throughout the encounter was relevant only to the issue of con-
sent, which is no longer a requirement for the crime of rape
under Section 3121.
An analysis of the supreme court's. decision in Berkowitz dem-
161. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 411 (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 412.
163. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1162.
164. Id. at 1164-65.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1165.
167. id. at 1164.
168. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3126.
169. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164-65.
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onstrates the irony in the evolution of the rape laws in Pennsyl-
vania. At common law, rape was defined as the unlawful carnal
knowledge of a woman, forcibly and against her will and the
force element was established through the conduct of the vic-
tim. 7' In response to the flawed nature of placing the empha-
sis on the victim's conduct, the MPC adopted an innovative ap-
proach which switched the emphasis to the assailant's ac-
tions.'71 Following this standard, the Pennsylvania General As-
sembly adopted Section 3121, deleting the phrases "against her
will" and "without her consent," and instead defining rape in
terms of the defendant's use of forcible compulsion.'
This deletion of the victim's conduct from the Pennsylvania
rape statute, however, allowed the Berkowitz court to minimize
the crime of rape under the guise of strict statutory interpreta-
tion. The court, by viewing the encounter solely in terms of the
amount of force employed by the defendant, downplayed the fact
that the complainant stated "no" throughout the encounter. The
court completely disregarded the issue of consent by relying on
the fact that lack of consent was not a requirement of the Penn-
sylvania rape statute. 73
Ironically, it could be argued, that the complainant in
Berkowitz had a better chance to establish the crime of rape at
common law than under Section 3121. If, in fact, the complain-
ant had been attacked at common law, the court would have
placed great emphasis on the fact that she stated "no" through-
out the encounter.'74 Under the new "liberal" standard of Sec-
tion 3121, though, which was supposedly enacted to protect the
rights of assaulted women, a victim who defiantly made known
her lack of consent during a sexual attack could not establish
that she was raped until the court first determined that the
assailant's conduct rose to the level of forcible compulsion.175
Assuredly, a court's determination of what constitutes forcible
compulsion would be of little concern to a victim who had clearly
made known her lack of consent during a sexual assault.
Thus, the court's decision in Berkowitz demonstrates a glaring
inconsistency in the Pennsylvania rape statute. Conduct which
would have been considered rape at common law is no longer
170. Stephens, 17 A-2d at 920 (citing Fletcher, 8 Cox C.C. at 134).
171. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 412 (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 399.
173. See Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164.
174. Her lack of consent would have illustrated the amount of force employed
by the actor. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 411 (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
175. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121.
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categorized as such under Section 3121. Section 3121 had the
unintended effect of creating further injustices for victims raped
under circumstances like those in Berkowitz.
In order to rectify this statutory deficiency, a balancing test,"
which considers both the victim's conduct and the actor's use of
force, should be established by either the courts or the Pennsyl-
vania General Assembly. This balancing test could most effec-
tively be defined and implemented by the legislature. Simply by
amending Section 3121 to include as an additional, alternative
means of establishing rape, the phrase "without the consent of
the other person,"' the Pennsylvania General Assembly could
successfully abridge this statutory deficiency without returning
to the injustices of the common law.'77
Additionally, the Berkowitz court was presented with an issue
concerning the proper application of the Rape Shield Law. The
Rape Shield Law was enacted in 1976 in an effort to prevent
personal attacks on the victim's character and sexual history at
trial. ' Generally, prior sexual conduct with third persons is
inadmissible to attack the character of the victim in a sex of-
fense case.'79
The broad exclusionary scope of Section 3104, however, is not
absolute. When confronted with an individual's Sixth Amend-
ment right to cross-examine witnesses, the Rape Shield Law
may be forced to yield in its application.8 0 According to the
Black court, a defendant had a constitutionally protected right to
introduce evidence which attempted to demonstrate the
witness's hostility or bias.' This exception, though, has been
limited to the facts of the Black case.8 2 Accordingly, evidence
which seeks to establish the witness's bias or hostility may only
be admissible if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial
effect on the victim.1 83
Following this limitation to the Black exception, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court in Berkowitz held inadmissible evidence of
the complainant's prior arguments with her boyfriend concern-
176. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §.3162(1).
177. Currently, there is a bill pending in the Pennsylvania House of Represen-
tatives that would delete the forcible compulsion requirement of Section 3121 from
the Crimes Code. See H.R. Res. 160, 176th Gen. Assem., 1993 Sess. (1993).
178. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 638 A.2d 940, 942 (Pa. 1994).
179. See Commonwealth v. Duncan, 421 A.2d 257, 259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
180. Black, 487 A.2d at 401. For further discussion of the Black exception see
notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
181. Id. at 400.
182. Id. at 399 n.7.
183. Id. at 401.
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ing her sexual history. 84 According to the court, the
defendant's evidence was so closely tied to the issue of the
complainant's fidelity, that for purposes of section 3104, its prej-
udicial effect far outweighed the probative value to the defen-
dant. '8
Notwithstanding the prejudicial/probative test, the Berkowitz
court could have rejected the defendant's proffer under an
alternative analysis. A subsequent limitation placed upon the
Black exception declared that any evidence offered to establish
the victim's consent was inadmissible under the Rape Shield
Law unless consent was at issue and the sexual conduct was
with the defendant.'" Although the defendant sought to intro-
duce evidence of the complainant's prior arguments concerning
her fidelity, it could be argued that this proffer, if admitted,
would indirectly establish the complainant's consent. According
to the defendant, his proffer sought to demonstrate the
complainant's fear of her jealous boyfriend. Thus, it could be
implied by a panel of jurors that in an attempt to mask her con-
sensual sexual relations with the defendant, the complainant
fabricated the rape charges to avoid yet another confrontation
with her boyfriend.
Therefore, if the Berkowitz court viewed the defendant's prof-
fer as an indirect assertion of the complainant's consent, the
evidence would still be inadmissible. Although the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court chose not to address this specific limitation to
the Black exception, the court similarly concluded that the
defendant's proffer of evidence was excluded by the Rape Shield
Law. In the future, courts should first ascertain if the
defendant's proffer attempts to establish the victim's consent,
which, if determined by the court, would eliminate the difficult
and often arbitrary application of the prejudicial/probative test.
Eric A. Kauffman
184. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1165.
185. Id.
186. Black, 487 A.2d at 399 n.7.
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